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is well executed. Nevertheless, controversy and interdisciplinary approaches 
are self-evidently not the first objectives of a Committee that still is working 
on the difficult task of constructing a common narrative. Opening up to new 
approaches in the historical sciences may be an important and final step for the 
German-Czech and German-Slovak Committee of Historians.
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The Red Army’s military effectiveness in World War Two can only be 
explained by beginning to understand the motivations of individual soldiers 
at foxhole-level. This is the starting premise of Roger R. Reese’s excellent 
study of the Red Army’s performance in World War Two. Utilizing a wealth 
of archival material and personal testimony, in the form of soldiers’ letters, 
diaries, memoirs and oral testimony, Reese brings alive the complex web of 
motivations Soviet citizens had for fighting, and continuing to fight, in the face 
of enormous casualties, horrific conditions and crushing defeats. Why Soviet 
soldiers waged war in the face of such adversity, in the name of a political 
system which had victimized so many, and how the Red Army succeeded in 
defeating the German army, have been asked before. Yet, Reese succeeds in 
offering new answers and insights into these problems, painting a picture of the 
Red Army as a much more effective fighting force than commonly appreciated.
 Although the book’s preface unconventionally recommends that the reader 
begin with its conclusions, the opening chapter nevertheless remains an 
important introduction to Reese’s definition of military effectiveness and 
his approach to his sources. Particular attention is paid to how individuals 
remember and express their war experiences, as well as the ways in which 
wartime propaganda and an official war memory have shaped individual 
memories. Reese stresses the limitations of oral histories as evidence, in 
particular the manner in which veterans internalized the state’s interpretation 
of war. The book’s twelve chapters make extensive use of interviews, particularly 
from the Harvard Interview Project and the ‘I Remember’ (‘Ia pomniu’) 
website: <http://www.iremember.ru>. However, Reese succeeds in filtering out 
veterans’ nostalgia and wartime and post-war propaganda myths. Indeed, the 
wealth of personal testimony, including from women and national minorities, 
eloquently supports Reese’s arguments and humanizes the common soldier.
 Chapter two offers an original reassessment of the Red Army’s performance 
in the Winter War. Reese challenges the established view that war with Finland 
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was a complete disaster, arguing that despite great inefficiency the Red Army 
remained an effective fighting force. Morale never entirely collapsed despite 
heavy casualties and poor combat performance. ‘Overall, the military’s staying 
power proved robust; soldiers kept fighting, and regiments remained cohesive’ 
(p. 54). The Red Army’s resilience in 1939 and 1940, therefore, hinted at its 
resilience during the Great Patriotic War. Chapters three and four re-examine 
the Red Army’s effectiveness during the battles of encirclement in 1941, and 
why so many soldiers found themselves in captivity. Reese attributes the 
defeats of 1941 not to the ineffectiveness of rank-and-file troops, but failures 
in command and military doctrine. He does not rule out the rejection of 
Stalinism as an explanation for capture, but stresses that most men fought 
until, and even after, their positions became hopeless.
 The mobilization of society for armed service is the subject of chapters five 
and six. They explore why some individuals and sections of society volunteered 
for armed service, whilst others, especially non-Slavic national and ethnic 
minorities, waited for conscription. Here Reese provides a complicated picture 
of Soviet citizens’ varied responses to the call to arms. The book’s largest 
section, approximately one hundred pages, explores how the state and army 
sustained morale and motivated combatants, as well as the circumstances 
when military effectiveness collapsed. Ideology, propaganda, leadership, 
the primary group, discipline, hatred and material rewards are explored in 
detail. The re-examination of the Red Army’s use of coercion is particularly 
important. Reese argues that, ‘Blocking detachments were never given carte 
blanche to execute soldiers’ (p. 164), and penal battalions although dangerous, 
‘were not suicide units, and service in them was always brief ’ (p. 165). Chapters 
eleven and twelve deal with the historical precedents, motivations for and 
experience of female military service. Although women’s service motivations 
often paralleled those of men, this section explores the possibility of gender-
based responses as well as the specific contributions of women to military 
effectiveness. 
 Reese concludes that although morale and motivation fluctuated dramatically, 
the Red Army remained militarily effective, despite its inefficiencies. Soviet 
soldiers fought for many reasons, including a genuine sense of patriotism. 
The coercive power of the Stalinist party-state, however, was less important 
in motivating combat and achieving military effectiveness. Most specialists in 
Russian history will find much that is familiar in this well written and carefully-
researched study, but there is much that is also original and surprising. A map 
with clearer shading might have been of greater assistance to general readers, 
but this is a minor criticism. Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought deserves to be read 
widely, particularly by undergraduates studying the Soviet war effort in World 
War Two.
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